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Abstract
Public announcement logic (PAL) is a logic for reasoning about the dynamic of
knowledge in a multi-agent system in which public announcements are made. Syn-
tactically, public announcements are modal formulas. Semantically, they correspond
to restrictions of models. In [10], Ma et al. use the standard toolkit of duality theory
in modal logic to define an algebraic semantics for a combination of IPL and PAL
into intuitionistic public announcement logic (IPAL). In this paper, grounding our
approach on relational semantics rather than on algebraic semantics, we give a sound
and complete axiomatization of IPAL and we consider a complete sequent calculus
for the associated membership problem.
Keywords: Public announcement logic. Intuitionistic propositional logic.
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1 Introduction
Public announcement logic (PAL) is a logic for reasoning about the dynamic
of knowledge in a multi-agent system [16]. Syntactically, public announce-
ments are modal formulas. Semantically, they correspond to restrictions of
models. There exist multifarious variants of PAL: PAL with arbitrary public
announcements [1], PAL with common knowledge [7], etc. In all these vari-
ants, the construct (· → ·) is the one of classical propositional logic. In [10],
Ma et al. introduce a variant of PAL in which this construct is the one of
intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). By using the standard toolkit of dual-
ity theory in modal logic, they define an algebraic semantics for a combination
of IPL and PAL into intuitionistic public announcement logic (IPAL). In
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this paper, grounding our approach on relational semantics rather than on al-
gebraic semantics, we provide supplementary results about IPAL. Firstly, we
give a sound and complete axiomatization of IPAL and we prove its complete-
ness. Secondly, we study the features that, according to Simpson [17], might be
expected of any intuitionistic modal logic and we examine whether IPAL pos-
sesses them. Thirdly, we propose an alternative semantics for IPAL, dealing
with stacks of annoucements, following the approach developed in [2] for PAL,
and then we derive from this semantics a new sequent calculus for IPAL that
is sound and complete. Fourthly, we define a translation of IPAL’s formulas
into formulas of a multimodal logic in which the construct (·→ ·) is the one of
classical propositional logic.
2 Syntax and semantics
Let V AR be a countable set of atomic formulas called variables (denoted p, q,
etc). The set of all formulas is inductively defined as follows:
• φ ::= p | ⊥ | (φ ∨ ψ) | (φ ∧ ψ) | (φ→ ψ) | !φ | ✸φ | [φ]ψ | 〈φ〉ψ.
⊥, (· ∨ ·), (· ∧ ·) and (· → ·) are the ordinary constructs of IPL, !· (“it is
necessary that . . .”) and ✸· (“it is possible that . . .”) are the alethic constructs
of modal logic and [·]· (“if . . . then, after announcing it, . . .”) and 〈·〉· (“. . . and,
after announcing it, . . .”) are the announcement constructs of PAL. The IPL
constructs ¬· and (·↔ ·) are defined as usual.
• ¬φ ::= (φ→ ⊥),
• (φ↔ ψ) ::= ((φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ)).
We adopt the standard rules for omission of the parentheses. Note that, follow-
ing the line of reasoning suggested by [17, Chapter 3], we have added the new
alethic constructs !· and ✸· and the new announcement constructs [·]· and 〈·〉·
to the ordinary language of IPL. As proved in Section 7 (see Propositions 7.4
and 7.5), the constructs !· and ✸· are independent in IPAL but [·]· and 〈·〉· are
interdefinable. For all formulas φ, let φ∗ be the formula obtained by recursively
eliminating the alethic constructs and the announcement constructs occurring
in φ. For all sets x of formulas, let !x = {φ: !φ ∈ x} and ✸x = {✸φ: φ ∈ x}.
Let the size of a formula φ (denoted size(φ)) be the number of occurrences
of symbols φ contains. The size of a finite sequence (φ1, . . . ,φn) of formulas
(denoted size(φ1, . . . ,φn)) is the nonnegative integer defined as follows:
• size(φ1, . . . ,φn) = size(φ1) + . . .+ size(φn) + n.
By ǫ, we will denote the empty sequence of formulas. Obviously, size(ǫ) = 0.
A frame is a tuple of the form F = (W,≤, R) where W is a nonempty set
(denoted x, y, etc), ≤ is a partial order on W and R is a binary relation on W .
The frame F = (W,≤, R) is said to be standard if
• R−1◦ ≤ ⊆ ≤ ◦R−1,
• R◦ ≤ ⊆ ≤ ◦R.
A valuation on a frame F = (W,≤, R) is a function V : V AR ,→ 2W . The
valuation V on the frame F = (W,≤, R) is said to be upward closed if
• for all p ∈ V AR and for all x ∈ W , if x ∈ V (p) then for all y ∈ W , if
x ≤ y then y ∈ V (p).
A model is a tuple of the form M = (W,≤, R, V ) where F = (W,≤, R) is a
frame and V is a valuation on F . We shall say that the modelM = (W,≤, R, V )
is standard if the frame F = (W,≤, R) is standard. The model M = (W,
≤, R, V ) is said to be upward closed if the valuation V on the frame F = (W,
≤, R) is upward closed. The satisfiability relation between a model M = (W,
≤, R, V ), an element x ∈W and a formula φ (denoted M, x |= φ) is inductively
defined as follows:
• M, x |= p iff x ∈ V (p),
• M, x -|= ⊥,
• M, x |= φ ∨ ψ iff either M, x |= φ, or M, x |= ψ,
• M, x |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, x |= φ and M, x |= ψ,
• M, x |= φ→ ψ iff for all y ∈W , if x ≤ y and M, y |= φ then M, y |= ψ,
• M, x |= !φ iff for all y, z ∈W , if x ≤ y and yRz then M, z |= φ,
• M, x |= ✸φ iff there exists y ∈W such that xRy and M, y |= φ,
• M, x |= [φ]ψ iff for all y ∈W , if x ≤ y and M, y |= φ then M|φ, y |= ψ,
• M, x |= 〈φ〉ψ iff M, x |= φ and M|φ, x |= ψ.
In the above definition, M|φ = (W|φ,≤|φ, R|φ, V|φ) is the model such that
W|φ = {x ∈ W : M, x |= φ}, ≤|φ=≤ ∩(W|φ ×W|φ), R|φ = R ∩ (W|φ ×W|φ)
and for all p ∈ V AR, V|φ(p) = V (p) ∩W|φ. Notice that the clauses concerning
the modal constructs !· and [·]· imitate the clauses for the quantifier ∀ in first-
order intuitionistic logic whereas the clauses concerning ✸· and 〈·〉· imitate
the clauses for ∃. See [6, Lemma 5.3.2] for details. Obviously, in any model
M = (W,≤, R, V ),
• M, x |= ¬φ iff for all y ∈W , if x ≤ y then M, y -|= φ,
• M, x |= φ↔ ψ iff for all y ∈W , if x ≤ y then M, y |= φ iff M, y |= ψ.
Note that if M is upward closed then M|φ is upward closed too. The next
lemma states that the set of elements satisfying a formula in an upward closed
standard model is upward closed too.
Lemma 2.1 Let φ be a formula. For all upward closed standard models M =
(W,≤, R, V ) and for all x ∈ W , if M, x |= φ then M|φ is upward closed
standard and for all y ∈W , if x ≤ y then M, y |= φ.
A formula φ is said to be globally satisfied in a model M = (W,≤, R, V )
(denoted M |= φ) if for all x ∈ W , M, x |= φ. The following Lemma will be
used in Section 7.
Lemma 2.2 Let φ be a formula. Let M = (W,≤, R, V ) be a model such that
≤ is the identity relation on W . If φ ∈ PAL then M |= φ.
There are several reasons for being interested in upward closed standard
models. Following the usual paradigm for IPL saying that facts should per-
sist in a model as we ascend its partial order, the fact that xRy in a model
M = (W,≤, R, V ) should persist too. Hence, the condition of being standard.
Similarly, the fact that x ∈ V (p) in a model M = (W,≤, R, V ) should persist
too. Thus, the condition of being upward closed.
3 Validities
We shall say that a formula φ is ucs-valid (denoted |=ucs φ) if for all upward
closed standard models M, M |= φ.
Proposition 3.1 The following formulas are ucs-valid and the following in-
ference rules are ucs-validity preserving:
A1 All instances of IPL,
A2 !(φ→ ψ)→ (!φ→ !ψ),
A3 !(φ→ ψ)→ (✸φ→ ✸ψ),
A4 (✸φ→ !ψ)→ !(φ→ ψ),
A5 ✸(φ ∨ ψ)→ (✸φ ∨✸ψ),
A6 ¬✸⊥,
A7 [φ]p↔ (φ→ p),
A8 [φ]⊥ ↔ ¬φ,
A9 [φ](ψ∨χ)↔ (φ→ ([φ]ψ∨ [φ]χ)),
A10 [φ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([φ]ψ ∧ [φ]χ),
A11 [φ](ψ → χ)↔ ([φ]ψ → [φ]χ),
A12 [φ]!ψ ↔ (φ→ ![φ]ψ),
A13 [φ]✸ψ ↔ (φ→ ✸〈φ〉ψ),
A14 〈φ〉ψ ↔ (φ ∧ [φ]ψ),
R1 from φ and φ→ ψ infer ψ,
R2 from φ infer !φ,
R3 from φ↔ ψ infer [χ]φ↔ [χ]ψ.
Proof. When restricted to announcement-free formulas, the formulas A1–A6
and the inference rules R1 and R2 have been used by Fischer Servi [8] and
Simpson [17, Chapter 3] who have considered the intuitionistic analogue IK
of modal logic K. The formulas A7, A8, A10, A12 and A13 have been used
by Ma et al. [10] as reduction axioms. Hence, leaving to the reader the proof
of the proposition for the formulas A9 and A11 and the inference rule R3, we
only prove the proposition for the formula A14.
Suppose -|=ucs 〈φ〉ψ ↔ (φ ∧ [φ]ψ). Let M = (W,≤, R, V ) be an upward closed
standard model and x ∈ W be such that M, x -|= 〈φ〉ψ ↔ (φ ∧ [φ]ψ). Hence,
either M, x -|= 〈φ〉ψ → (φ∧ [φ]ψ), or M, x -|= (φ∧ [φ]ψ)→ 〈φ〉ψ. In the former
case, let y ∈ W be such that x ≤ y, M, y |= 〈φ〉ψ and M, y -|= φ ∧ [φ]ψ.
Thus, M, y |= φ, M|φ, y |= ψ and M, y -|= [φ]ψ. Let z ∈ W be such that
y ≤ z, M, z |= φ and M|φ, z -|= ψ. Since M, y |= φ, therefore y ≤|φ z. Since
M|φ, y |= ψ, therefore by Lemma 2.1, M|φ, z |= ψ: a contradiction. In the
latter case, let y ∈ W be such that x ≤ y, M, y |= φ ∧ [φ]ψ and M, y -|= 〈φ〉ψ.
Consequently, M, y |= φ, M, y |= [φ]ψ and M|φ, y -|= ψ. Hence, M|φ, y |= ψ: a
contradiction. Thus, |=ucs 〈φ〉ψ ↔ (φ ∧ [φ]ψ). ✷
Proposition 3.2 The following formulas are ucs-valid and the following in-
ference rule is ucs-validity preserving:
A15 [φ](ψ → χ)→ ([φ]ψ → [φ]χ),
A16 [φ](ψ → χ)→ (〈φ〉ψ → 〈φ〉χ),
A17 (〈φ〉ψ → [φ]χ)→ [φ](ψ → χ),
A18 〈φ〉(ψ ∨ χ)→ (〈φ〉ψ ∨ 〈φ〉χ),
R4 from φ infer [ψ]φ.
Proof. Left to the reader. ✷
Proposition 3.3 The following formulas are ucs-valid:
A19 [φ]⊤ ↔ ⊤,
A20 〈φ〉⊥ ↔ ⊥,
A21 〈φ〉⊤ ↔ φ,
A22 [φ](ψ∨χ)↔ (φ→ 〈φ〉ψ∨〈φ〉χ),
A23 〈φ〉(ψ ∨ χ)↔ 〈φ〉ψ ∨ 〈φ〉χ,
A24 [φ](ψ → χ)↔ (〈φ〉ψ → 〈φ〉χ),
A25 〈φ〉(ψ → χ) ↔ φ ∧ (〈φ〉ψ →
〈φ〉χ),
A26 〈φ〉✸ψ ↔ φ ∧✸〈φ〉ψ,
A27 〈φ〉p↔ φ ∧ p,
A28 〈φ〉(ψ ∧ χ)↔ 〈φ〉ψ ∧ 〈φ〉χ,
A29 〈φ〉✷ψ ↔ φ ∧✷[φ]ψ.
Proof. Left to the reader. ✷
Note that the set of all ucs-valid formulas is not closed under the inference
rule of uniform substitution. For example, the formula [p]p is ucs-valid but
its instance [q ∧ ✸¬q](q ∧ ✸¬q) is not globally satisfied in the upward closed
standard model M = (W,≤, R, V ) where W = {x, y}, ≤= {(x, x), (y, y)},
R = {(x, y)} and V (q) = {x}. Hence, we should be very careful when applying
to IPAL tools and techniques designed for normal modal logic.
4 Axiomatization/completeness
Let IPAL be the least set of formulas containing the formulas A1–A14 and
closed under the inference rules R1–R3. The soundness of IPAL relative to its
relational semantics is straightforward, seeing that
Proposition 4.1 (Soundness) Let φ be a formula. If φ ∈ IPAL then |=ucs
φ.
Proof. By Proposition 3.1. ✷
Without using the standard toolkit of duality theory in modal logic and the
results in [10], the completeness of IPAL relative to its relational semantics is
more difficult to establish than its soundness and we defer proving that IPAL
is complete with respect to the class of all upward closed standard models till
the end of this section. A useful result is the following
Proposition 4.2 Let φ be a formula and ψ be an announcement-free formula
such that φ ↔ ψ ∈ IPAL. Let χ be an announcement-free formula. There
exists an announcement-free formula θ such that [φ]χ↔ θ ∈ IPAL. Moreover,
if ψ and χ are !-free (respectively, ✸-free) then θ is !-free (respectively, ✸-
free).
Proof. Let FOR be the set of all announcement-free formulas χ such that
there exists an announcement-free formula θ such that [φ]χ↔ θ ∈ IPAL and,
moreover, if ψ and χ are !-free (respectively, ✸-free) then θ is !-free (respec-
tively, ✸-free). Proposition 4.2 says that for all announcement-free formulas χ,
χ ∈ FOR. We will demonstrate it by an induction on χ based on the function
size(·) defined in Section 2. Let χ be an announcement-free formula such that
for all announcement-free formulas µ, if size(µ) < size(χ) then µ ∈ FOR. We
demonstrate χ ∈ FOR. We only consider the case χ = ✸µ.
Note that size(µ) < size(χ). Hence, µ ∈ FOR. Let θ be an announcement-free
formula such that [φ]µ↔ θ ∈ IPAL. By A13, [φ]✸µ↔ (φ→ ✸〈φ〉µ) ∈ IPAL.
Since φ ↔ ψ ∈ IPAL, therefore [φ]✸µ ↔ (ψ → ✸〈φ〉µ) ∈ IPAL. By A14,
〈φ〉µ ↔ (φ ∧ [φ]µ) ∈ IPAL. Since φ ↔ ψ ∈ IPAL and [φ]µ ↔ θ ∈ IPAL,
therefore 〈φ〉µ ↔ (ψ ∧ θ) ∈ IPAL. Thus, ✸〈φ〉µ ↔ ✸(ψ ∧ θ) ∈ IPAL. Since
[φ]✸µ↔ (ψ → ✸〈φ〉µ) ∈ IPAL, therefore [φ]✸µ↔ (ψ → ✸(ψ∧θ)) ∈ IPAL.✷
From Proposition 4.2, it follows that
Proposition 4.3 For all formulas φ, there exists an announcement-free for-
mula ψ such that φ ↔ ψ ∈ IPAL. Moreover, if φ is !-free (respectively,
✸-free) then ψ is !-free (respectively, ✸-free).
Proof. Let FOR be the set of all formulas φ such that there exists an
announcement-free formula ψ such that φ ↔ ψ ∈ IPAL and, moreover, if
φ is !-free (respectively, ✸-free) then ψ is !-free (respectively, ✸-free). Propo-
sition 4.3 says that for all formulas φ, φ ∈ FOR. We will demonstrate it by an
induction on φ based on the function size(·) defined in Section 2. Let φ be a for-
mula such that for all announcement-free formulas ψ, if size(ψ) < size(φ) then
ψ ∈ FOR. We demonstrate φ ∈ FOR. We only consider the case φ = [ψ]χ.
Note that size(ψ) < size(φ) and size(χ) < size(φ). Hence, ψ ∈ FOR and
χ ∈ FOR. Let θ be an announcement-free formula such that ψ ↔ θ ∈ IPAL
and µ be an announcement-free formula such that χ ↔ µ ∈ IPAL. By R3,
[ψ]χ ↔ [ψ]µ ∈ IPAL. Let ν be an announcement-free formula such that
[ψ]µ ↔ ν ∈ IPAL. Such ν exists by Proposition 4.2 because ψ ↔ θ ∈ IPAL.
Since [ψ]χ↔ [ψ]µ ∈ IPAL, therefore [ψ]χ↔ ν ∈ IPAL. ✷
Now, we are ready for the proof of the completeness of IPAL relative to
its relational semantics.
Proposition 4.4 (Completeness) Let φ be a formula. If |=ucs φ then φ ∈
IPAL.
Proof. Suppose |=ucs φ and φ -∈ IPAL. Let ψ be an announcement-free
formula such that φ ↔ ψ ∈ IPAL. Such formula exists by Proposition 4.3.
Since φ -∈ IPAL, therefore ψ -∈ IPAL. By the Canonical Model Construction
described in [17, Chapter 3], -|=ucs ψ. Since φ ↔ ψ ∈ IPAL, therefore by
Proposition 4.1, |=ucs φ↔ ψ. Since -|=ucs ψ, therefore -|=ucs φ: a contradiction.
Hence, if |=ucs φ then φ ∈ IPAL. ✷
In the definition of IPAL, we did not use the formulas A15–A29 and the
inference rule R4 considered in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3. Why not? The reason
is that neither the formulas A15–A29 nor the inference rule R4 are used in the
proof of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3. Moreover,
Proposition 4.5 The formulas A15–A29 are in IPAL and the inference rule
R4 is admissible in IPAL.
Proof. By Propositions 3.2, 3.3, 4.1 and 4.4. ✷
5 Canonical model
Let L be an extension of IPAL, i.e. L is a set of formulas containing the
formulas A1–A14 and closed under the inference rules R1–R3. For all sets x, y
of formulas, y is said to be an L-consequence of x (denoted x ⊢L y) if there exists
nonnegative integers m,n and there exists formulas φ1, . . . ,φm,ψ1, . . . ,ψn such
that φ1, . . . ,φm ∈ x, ψ1, . . . ,ψn ∈ y and φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φm → ψ1 ∨ . . .ψn ∈ L. In
this definition, if m = 0 then we will consider that φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φm is equal to ⊤
and if n = 0 then we will consider that ψ1 ∨ . . .ψn is equal to ⊥. In the sequel,
we will always assume that ∅ -⊢L ∅, i.e. we will always assume that ⊤ → ⊥ -∈ L.
We shall say that a set x of formulas is L-prime if the following conditions hold:
• for all formulas φ, if x ⊢L {φ} then φ ∈ x,
• x -⊢L {⊥},
• for all formulas φ,ψ, if φ ∨ ψ ∈ x then either φ ∈ x, or ψ ∈ x.
Lemma 5.1 (Prime Lemma) For all sets x, y of formulas, if x -⊢L y then
there exists an L-prime set x′ of formulas such that x ⊆ x′ and x′ -⊢L y.
Since ∅ -⊢L ∅, therefore the set of all L-prime sets of formulas is nonempty. L’s
Canonical Model is the tuple Mc = (Wc,≤c, Rc, Vc) where Wc is the set of all
L-prime sets of formulas, ≤c is the partial order on Wc defined by x ≤c y iff
x ⊆ y, Rc is the binary relation on Wc defined by xRcy iff !x ⊆ y and
✸y ⊆ x and Vc: V AR ,→ 2
Wc is the function defined by x ∈ Vc(p) iff p ∈ x.
Lemma 5.2 The model Mc is upward closed standard.
Lemma 5.3 (Restricted Truth Lemma) Let φ be an announcement-free
formula. For all L-prime sets x of formulas, the following conditions are equiv-
alent: (i) Mc, x |= φ, (ii) φ ∈ x.
Lemma 5.4 (Truth Lemma) Let φ be a formula. For all L-prime sets x of
formulas, the following conditions are equivalent: (i) Mc, x |= φ, (ii) φ ∈ x.
In Section 7, we will consider an extension of IPAL that contains all for-
mulas of the form φ ∨ ¬φ.
Proposition 5.5 Let L be an extension of IPAL that contains all formulas of
the form φ∨¬φ. For all L-primes sets x, y of formulas, if x ⊆ y then x = y.
Proof. Let x, y be L-primes sets of formulas. Suppose x ⊆ y and x -= y.
Hence, y -⊆ x. Let ψ be a formula such that ψ ∈ y and ψ -∈ x. Since
L is an extension of IPAL that contains all formulas of the form φ ∨ ¬φ,
therefore ψ ∨ ¬ψ ∈ x. Thus, either ψ ∈ x, or ¬ψ ∈ x. Since ψ -∈ x, therefore
¬ψ ∈ x. Since x ⊆ y, therefore ¬ψ ∈ y. Since ψ ∈ y, therefore y ⊢L {⊥}: a
contradiction. Consequently, if x ⊆ y then x = y. ✷
6 Relationship with Ma et al. [10]
A formula φ is said to be a-valid (denoted |=a φ) if for all algebraic models
M = (A, 0A, 1A,+A,×A,⇒A, lA,mA, V ) (called Fischer Servi models in [10]),
| φ |M= 1A.
Proposition 6.1 Let φ be a formula. If |=ucs φ then |=a φ.
Proof. Suppose |=ucs φ and -|=a φ. By Proposition 4.4, φ ∈ IPAL. Since
the formulas considered in Proposition 3.1 are a-valid and the inference rules
considered in Proposition 3.1 are a-validity preserving, therefore |=a φ: a con-
tradiction. ✷
Proposition 6.2 Let φ be a formula. If |=a φ then |=ucs φ.
Proof. Suppose |=a φ and -|=ucs φ. By [10], φ is derivable from the axioms
and the inference rules considered in [10, Section 4.1]. Obviously, these axioms
are standard-valid and these inference rules are standard-validity preserving.
Hence, |=ucs φ: a contradiction. ✷
Let IPAL′ be the least set of formulas containing the formulas A1–A8, A10,
A13 and A19–A29 and closed under the inference rules R1 and R2. The de-
ducibility relation between a finite set X of variables and a formula φ (denoted
X ⊲ φ) is inductively defined as follows:
• X ⊲ p iff p ∈ X,
• X - ⊲⊥,
• X⊲φ∨ψ iff eitherX⊲φ, orX⊲ψ,
• X ⊲ φ ∧ ψ iff X ⊲ φ and X ⊲ ψ,
• X ⊲φ→ ψ iff if X ⊲φ then X ⊲ψ,
• X ⊲!φ iff X ⊲ φ,
• X ⊲✸φ iff X ⊲ φ,
• X ⊲ [φ]ψ iff if X ⊲φ then X ⊲ψ∗,
• X ⊲ 〈φ〉ψ iff X ⊲ φ and X ⊲ ψ∗.
Note that the axioms and the inference rules considered in [10, Section 4.1]
do not explicitly contain the inference rule R3. Hence, they are those of IPAL′.
We believe that this absence of the inference rule R3 is only a careless mistake,
seeing that
Lemma 6.3 Let X be a finite set of variables and φ be a formula. If φ ∈
IPAL′ then X ⊲ φ.
Lemma 6.4 Let X be a finite set of variables. If p ∈ X, q -∈ X and r ∈ X
then X ⊲ 〈p〉〈q〉r and X - ⊲〈〈p〉q〉r.
Proposition 6.5 (i) 〈p〉〈q〉r → 〈〈p〉q〉r ∈ IPAL.
(ii) 〈p〉〈q〉r → 〈〈p〉q〉r -∈ IPAL′.
Proof. (i) It suffices to use the completeness of IPAL (Proposition 4.4) and
the fact that 〈p〉〈q〉r → 〈〈p〉q〉r is ucs-valid.
(ii) By Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4. ✷
7 Other properties of IPAL
In [17], Simpson discusses what it means to combine IPL and modal logic into
intuitionistic modal logic (IML) and isolates features that might be expected
of an IML. In the following proposition, we examine whether IPAL complains
with Simpson’s requirements.
Proposition 7.1 (i) IPAL is conservative over IPL.
(ii) IPAL contains all instances of IPL.
(iii) IPAL is closed under modus ponens.
(iv) The addition of the formulas of the form φ ∨ ¬φ to IPAL yields PAL.
(v) If φ ∨ ψ ∈ IPAL then either φ ∈ IPAL, or ψ ∈ IPAL.
Proof. (i) Let φ be a modality-free formula. To prove that φ ∈ IPAL iff
φ ∈ IPL, it suffices to use the soundness/completeness of IPAL (Proposi-
tions 4.1 and 4.4) and IPL (Theorem 2.43 in [5]).
(ii) By definition, IPAL contains all instances of IPL.
(iii) By definition, IPAL is closed under modus ponens.
(iv) Let IPAL+ be the axiom system consisting of the addition of the formulas
of the form φ ∨ ¬φ to IPAL. Suppose IPAL+ does not yield PAL. Hence,
IPAL+ -= PAL. Obviously, IPAL+ ⊆ PAL. Since IPAL+ -= PAL, there-
fore PAL -⊆ IPAL+. Let ψ be a formula such that ψ ∈ PAL and ψ -∈ IPAL+.
Let χ be an announcement-free formula such that ψ ↔ χ ∈ IPAL. Such for-
mula exists by Proposition 4.3. Thus, ψ ↔ χ ∈ IPAL+. Since ψ -∈ IPAL+,
therefore χ -∈ IPAL+. Let Mc = (Wc,≤c, Rc, Vc) be IPAL
+’s Canonical
Model. Since χ -∈ IPAL+, therefore by Lemmas 5.1 and 5.4, there exists
x ∈ Wc such that Mc, x -|= χ. Since IPAL
+ is an extension of IPAL that
contains all formulas of the form φ∨¬φ, therefore by Proposition 5.5, ≤c is the
identity relation on Wc. Since Mc, x -|= χ, therefore by Lemma 2.2, χ -∈ PAL.
Obviously, IPAL ⊆ PAL. Since ψ ↔ χ ∈ IPAL, therefore ψ ↔ χ ∈ PAL.
Since χ -∈ PAL, therefore ψ -∈ PAL: a contradiction. Consequently, IPAL+
yields PAL.
(v) Suppose φ ∨ ψ ∈ IPAL, φ -∈ IPAL and ψ -∈ IPAL. By Propositions 4.1
and 4.4, |=ucs φ ∨ ψ, -|=ucs φ and -|=ucs ψ. Let M1 = (W1,≤1, R1, V1) be an
upward closed standard model such that M1 -|= φ and M2 = (W2,≤2, R2, V2)
be an upward closed standard model such that M2 -|= ψ. Let x be a new
element and M = (W,≤, R, V ) be the model where W = W1 ∪ W2 ∪ {x},
≤=≤1 ∪ ≤2 ∪({x} ×W1) ∪ ({x} ×W2), R = R1 ∪ R2 and for all p ∈ V AR,
V (p) = V1(p) ∪ V2(p). The reader may easily verify that M is upward closed
standard. Moreover, M1 and M2 are generated submodel of M. A result
similar to Proposition 2.6 in [4] would lead to the conclusion that the global
satisfiability relation is invariant under generated submodels. Since M1 -|= φ
and M2 -|= ψ, therefore M -|= φ and M -|= ψ. Since |=ucs φ ∨ ψ, therefore
M, x |= φ ∨ ψ. Hence, either M, x |= φ, or M, x |= ψ. In the former case, let
y ∈ W1 be arbitrary. Thus, x ≤ y. Since M, x |= φ, therefore by Lemma 2.1,
M, y |= φ. Consequently, M1, y |= φ. Since y was arbitrary, thereforeM1 |= φ:
a contradiction. In the latter case, let y ∈W2 be arbitrary. Hence, x ≤ y. Since
M, x |= ψ, therefore by Lemma 2.1, M, y |= ψ. Thus, M2, y |= ψ. Since y was
arbitrary, therefore M2 |= ψ: a contradiction. Consequently, if φ ∨ ψ ∈ IPAL
then either φ ∈ IPAL, or ψ ∈ IPAL. ✷
In [17, Chapter 3], Simpson proves the following
Proposition 7.2 (i) For all announcement-free formulas φ, if φ ∈ IK then
|=ucs φ.
(ii) For all announcement-free formulas φ, if |=ucs φ then φ ∈ IK.
(iii) There exists no !·-free announcement-free formula φ such that !p↔ φ ∈
IK.
(iv) There exists no ✸·-free announcement-free formula φ such that ✸p↔ φ ∈
IK.
From the soundness/completeness of IPAL (Propositions 4.1 and 4.4) and
IK (Items 1 and 2 of Proposition 7.2), we obtain the following
Proposition 7.3 IPAL is conservative over IK.
The following propositions characterize a main difference between, on one
hand, the modal constructs !· and ✸· and, on the other hand, [·]· and 〈·〉·.
Proposition 7.4 (i) There exists no !·-free formula φ such that !p↔ φ ∈
IPAL.
(ii) There exists no ✸·-free formula φ such that ✸p↔ φ ∈ IPAL.
Proof. (i) By Proposition 4.3, Item 3 of Proposition 7.2 and Proposition 7.3.
(ii) By Proposition 4.3, Item 4 of Proposition 7.2 and Proposition 7.3. ✷
Proposition 7.5 (i) [φ]ψ ↔ (φ→ 〈φ〉ψ) ∈ IPAL.
(ii) 〈φ〉ψ ↔ (φ ∧ [φ]ψ) ∈ IPAL.
Proof. (i) Suppose [φ]ψ ↔ (φ → 〈φ〉ψ) -∈ IPAL. By Proposition 4.4, -|=ucs
[φ]ψ ↔ (φ → 〈φ〉ψ). Let M = (W,≤, R, V ) be an upward closed standard
model and x ∈ W be such that M, x -|= [φ]ψ ↔ (φ → 〈φ〉ψ). Hence, either
M, x -|= [φ]ψ → (φ → 〈φ〉ψ), or M, x -|= (φ → 〈φ〉ψ) → [φ]ψ. In the former
case, let y ∈ W be such that x ≤ y, M, y |= [φ]ψ and M, y -|= φ → 〈φ〉ψ. Let
z ∈ W be such that y ≤ z, M, z |= φ and M, z -|= 〈φ〉ψ. Thus, M|φ, z -|= ψ.
Since y ≤ z and M, z |= φ, therefore M, y -|= [φ]ψ: a contradiction. In the
latter case, let y ∈W be such that x ≤ y, M, y |= φ→ 〈φ〉ψ and M, y -|= [φ]ψ.
Let z ∈ W be such that y ≤ z, M, z |= φ and M|φ, z -|= ψ. Consequently,
M, z -|= 〈φ〉ψ. Since y ≤ z and M, z |= φ, therefore M, y -|= φ → 〈φ〉ψ: a
contradiction. Hence, [φ]ψ ↔ (φ→ 〈φ〉ψ) ∈ IPAL.
(ii) By definition, 〈φ〉ψ ↔ (φ ∧ [φ]ψ) ∈ IPAL. ✷
8 An alternative semantics
A proof-theoretical analysis of PAL has been proposed in [11] in terms of a
sequent calculus following the approach of [13]. Unfortunately, this sequent
calculus is not complete as it cannot prove the valid formula [p ∧ p]q ↔ [p]q.
For details, see [2] where an alternative semantics for PAL and a sequent
calculus with labels that were based on a specific management of a stack of an-
noucements have been proposed. A similar alternative semantics for IPAL can
be proposed too. Its definition necessitates the satisfiability relation between a
model M = (W,≤, R, V ), an element x ∈W , a finite sequence ϕ = (φ1, . . . ,φn)
of formulas and a formula φ (denoted M, x, (ϕ) " φ) inductively defined as fol-
lows:
• M, x, ǫ " p iff x ∈ V (p),
• M, x, (ϕ,φn+1) " p iff M, x, (ϕ) " φn+1 and M, x, (ϕ) " p,
• M, x, (ϕ) -" ⊥,
• M, x, (ϕ) " φ ∨ ψ iff either M, x, (ϕ) " φ, or M, x, (ϕ) " ψ,
• M, x, (ϕ) " φ ∧ ψ iff M, x, (ϕ) " φ and M, x, (ϕ) " ψ,
• M, x, ǫ " φ → ψ iff for all y ∈ W , if x ≤ y and M, y, ǫ " φ then
M, y, ǫ " ψ,
• M, x, (ϕ,φn+1) " φ→ ψ iff for all y ∈W , if x ≤ y, M, y, (ϕ) " φn+1 and
M, y, (ϕ,φn+1) " φ then M, y, (ϕ,φn+1) " ψ,
• M, x, ǫ " !φ iff for all y, z ∈W , if x ≤ y and yRz then M, z, ǫ " φ,
• M, x, (ϕ,φn+1) " !φ iff for all y, z ∈W , if x ≤ y, yRz, M, y, (ϕ) " φn+1
and M, z, (ϕ) " φn+1 then M, z, (ϕ,φn+1) " φ,
• M, x, ǫ " ✸φ iff there exists y ∈W such that xRy and M, y, ǫ " φ,
• M, x, (ϕ,φn+1) " ✸φ iff there exists y ∈ W such that xRy, M, y, (ϕ) "
φn+1 and M, y, (ϕ,φn+1) " φ,
• M, x, ǫ " [φ]ψ iff for all y ∈W , if x ≤ y and M, y, ǫ " φ then M, y, (φ) "
ψ,
• M, x, (ϕ,φn+1) " [φ]ψ iff for all y ∈ W , if x ≤ y, M, y, (ϕ) " φn+1 and
M, y, (ϕ,φn+1) " φ then M, y, (ϕ,φn+1,φ) " ψ,
• M, x, (ϕ) " 〈φ〉ψ iff M, x, (ϕ) " φ and M, x, (ϕ,φ) " ψ.
The reader may easily verify that the above definition ofM, x, (ϕ) " φ is correct
decreasing on size(ϕ,φ). A similar stack-based semantics has been proposed
by Balbiani et al. [2] within the context of PAL. The main difference with the
semantics proposed by [11] lies in our interpretation of !-based formulas.
Lemma 8.1 Let (φ1, . . . ,φn) be a sequence of formulas and φ be a formula.
For all models M = (W,≤, R, V ) and for all x ∈ W , the following con-
ditions are equivalent: (i) M, x |= [φ1] . . . [φn]φ, (ii) if M, x, ǫ " φ1, . . . ,
M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn−1) " φn then M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn) " φ.
9 A labelled sequent calculus
Now, we present a sequent calculus for IPAL that is derived from the stack-
based semantics given in the previous section. We propose a labelled calculus
x(ǫ) : p, Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ǫ) : p
ax
x(ǫ) : ⊥, Γ ⊢ ∆
L⊥
x(ϕ) : φ, x(ϕ) : p, Γ ⊢ ∆
x(ϕ,φ) : p, Γ ⊢ ∆
Lp
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ) : φ Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ) : p
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ,φ) : p
Rp
x(ϕ) : φ, x(ϕ) : ψ, Γ ⊢ ∆
x(ϕ) : φ ∧ ψ, Γ ⊢ ∆
L∧
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ) : φ Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ) : ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ) : φ ∧ ψ
R∧
x(ϕ) : φ, Γ ⊢ ∆ x(ϕ) : ψ, Γ ⊢ ∆
x(ϕ) : φ ∨ ψ, Γ ⊢ ∆
L∨
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ) : φ
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ) : φ ∨ ψ
R∨1
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ) : ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ) : φ ∨ ψ
R∨2
x ≤ y,Γ ⊢ y(ǫ) : φ x ≤ y,Γ, y(ǫ) : ψ ⊢ ∆
x(ǫ) : φ→ ψ,Γ ⊢ ∆
L→ǫ
Γ, x ≤ y, y(ǫ) : φ ⊢ ∆, y(ǫ) : ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ǫ) : φ→ ψ
R→ǫ
Γ, x ≤ y, y(ϕ) : φn+1,⊢ y(ϕ,φn+1) : φ Γ, x ≤ y, y(ϕ,φn+1) : ψ ⊢ ∆
Γ, x(ϕ,φn+1) : φ→ ψ ⊢ ∆
L→ϕ
Γ, x ≤ y, y(ϕ) : φn+1, y(ϕ,φn+1) : φ ⊢ ∆, y(ϕ,φn+1) : ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ,φn+1) : φ→ ψ
R→ϕ
Fig. 1. Inference rules for IPAL - intuitionistic rules.
in which labels are defined for capturing the semantics inside the sequent calcu-
lus. This approach based on labels is a uniform approach for designing calculi
in various logics like modal or intuitionistic logics [13,17] from Kripke-style se-
mantics. We want to emphasize that starting from our stack-based semantics
is central here because the similar semantics proposed for PAL allowed us to
propose a new labelled calculus for PAL that corrected the deficiency about
completeness of an existing labelled sequent calculus [11]. Therefore we propose
a sound and complete calculus with sequents that are with multiconclusions,
and with distinguished rules for dealing with empty and non-empty stacks of
announcements. Let V ar be a countable set of variables (denoted x, y, etc).
The sequents are pairs of finite sets of expressions either of the form x(ϕ) : φ
read “state x satisfies φ with respect to the sequence (ϕ)”, or of the form xRy
read “state x is related to state y by means of R”. The sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ means
that the conjunction of the expressions in Γ implies the disjunction of the ex-
pressions in ∆. Provability is defined as usual: formula φ is provable iff the
sequent ⊢ x(ǫ) : φ is derivable from the inference rules of the calculus presented
in Figures 1 and 2. Let M = (W,R, V ) be a model and f : V ar ,→ W . Se-
quents are pairs of finite sets of expressions either of the form x(φ1, . . . ,φn) : φ,
or of the form xRy. We define the property “M and f satisfy the expression
exp” (denoted M, f " exp) as follows:
• M, f " x(φ1, . . . ,φn) : φ iff M, f(x), (φ1, . . . ,φn) " φ,
• M, f " xRy iff f(x)Rf(y).
x(ǫ) : !φ, x ≤ y, yRz, z(ǫ) : φ, Γ ⊢ ∆
x(ǫ) : !φ, x ≤ y, yRz,Γ ⊢ ∆
L!ǫ
x ≤ y, yRz, Γ ⊢ ∆, z(ǫ) : φ
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ǫ) : !φ
R!ǫ
x(ϕ,φn+1) : !ψ, x ≤ y, yRz, z(ϕ,φn+1) : φ, Γ ⊢ ∆
x(ϕ,φn+1) : !ψ, x ≤ y, yRz, z(ϕ) : φn+1, Γ ⊢ ∆
L!ϕ
x ≤ y, yRz, z(ϕ) : φn+1, Γ ⊢ ∆, z(ϕ,φn+1) : φ
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ,φn+1) : !φ
R!ϕ
y(ǫ) : φ, xRy, Γ ⊢ ∆
x(ǫ) : ✸φ, Γ ⊢ ∆
L✸ǫ
Γ ⊢ ∆, y(ǫ) : φ, xRy
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ǫ) : ✸φ
R✸ǫ
y(ϕ) : φ, xRy, y(ϕ,φn+1) : φ, Γ ⊢ ∆
x(ϕ,φn+1) : ✸φ, Γ ⊢ ∆
L✸ϕ
Γ ⊢ ∆, y(ϕ) : φn+1, xRy, y(ϕ,φn+1) : φ
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ,φn+1) : ✸φ
R✸ϕ
Γ, x ≤ y ⊢ ∆, y(ǫ) : φ y(φ) : ψ, Γ ⊢ ∆
x(ǫ) : [φ]ψ, Γ ⊢ ∆
L[]ǫ
Γ, x ≤ y, y(ǫ) : φ ⊢ ∆, y(φ) : ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ǫ) : [φ]ψ
R[]ǫ
x ≤ y, y(ϕ) : φn+1, Γ ⊢ ∆, y(ϕ,φn+1) : φ y(ϕ,φn+1) : ψ, Γ ⊢ ∆
x(ϕ,φn+1) : [φ]ψ, Γ ⊢ ∆
L[]ϕ
x ≤ y, y(ϕ) : φn+1, y(ϕ,φn+1) : φ, Γ ⊢ ∆, y(ϕ,φn+1,φ) : ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ,φn+1) : [φ]ψ
R[]ϕ
Γ, x(ϕ) : φ, x(ϕ,φ) : ψ ⊢ ∆
Γ, x(ϕ) : 〈φ〉ψ, ⊢ ∆
L<>
Γ, ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ) : φ Γ, ⊢ ∆, x(ϕ,φ) : ψ
Γ, ⊢ x(ϕ) : 〈φ〉ψ
R<>
Fig. 2. Inference rules for IPAL - modal rules.
We say that a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is valid iff for all models M = (W,R, V ) and for
all f : V ar ,→ W , if M and f satisfy every expression in Γ, then M and f
satisfy some expression in ∆.
Proposition 9.1 Let φ be a formula. If φ is provable then φ is ucs-valid.
Proof. It suffices to demonstrate that the inference rules considered in Fig-
ures 1 and 2 are validity preserving. ✷
Proposition 9.2 Let φ be a formula. If φ is ucs-valid then φ is provable.
Proof. By Proposition 4.4, it suffices to demonstrate that the formulas con-
sidered in Proposition 3.1 are provable and the inference rules considered in
Proposition 3.1 are provability preserving. ✷
In Nomura et al. [14], a labelled sequent calculus has been recently given
for IPAL. It is basically the same as the one for PAL [15] but with, in some
rules, restrictions on labelled expressions on the right-hand side of sequents.
As this calculus does not use an announcement stack discipline and has such
restrictions, it cannot be directly and easily compared with our new calculus.
In future work, we will try to compare them with respect, for instance, to proof-
search issues and also to explore possible translations between these calculi.
10 Translation into S4PAL
By Go¨del’s Translation, any formula of the IPL’s language can be translated
into a formula of the S4’s language such that the resulting translation is in S4
iff the translated formula is in IPL. See [5, Chapter 3] for details. Within the
context of IPAL, the translation of a formula φ (denoted τ(φ)) is the formula
inductively defined as follows:
• τ(p) = #p,
• τ(⊥) = ⊥,
• τ(φ ∨ ψ) = τ(φ) ∨ τ(ψ),
• τ(φ ∧ ψ) = τ(φ) ∧ τ(ψ),
• τ(φ→ ψ) = #(τ(φ)→ τ(ψ)),
• τ(!φ) = #!τ(φ),
• τ(✸φ) = ✸τ(φ),
• τ([φ]ψ) = #[τ(φ)]τ(ψ),
• τ(〈φ〉ψ) = 〈τ(φ)〉τ(ψ).
The resulting translations belong to the S4PAL’s language, i.e. the set of
all formulas inductively defined as follows:
• φ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬φ | (φ ∨ ψ) | #φ | !φ | [φ]ψ.
In the S4PAL’s language, the Boolean constructs (· ∧ ·) and (· → ·), the
modal constructs $· and ✸· and the announcement construct 〈·〉· are defined
as usual. Moreover, the standard rules for omission of the parentheses are
adopted. The formulas of the S4PAL’s language are interpreted in models,
their ≤ binary relations being used to interpret #-based formulas and their R
binary relations being used to interpret !-based formulas. More precisely, the
satisfiability relation between a model M = (W,≤, R, V ), an element x ∈ W
and a formula φ in the S4PAL’s language (denoted M, x |= φ) is inductively
defined as follows:
• M, x |= p iff x ∈ V (p),
• M, x -|= ⊥,
• M, x |= φ ∨ ψ iff either M, x |= φ, or M, x |= ψ,
• M, x |= #φ iff for all y ∈W , if x ≤ y then M, y |= φ,
• M, x |= !φ iff for all y ∈W , if xRy then M, y |= φ,
• M, x |= [φ]ψ iff if M, x |= φ then M|φ, x |= ψ.
In the above definition, M|φ = (W|φ,≤|φ, R|φ, V|φ) is the model such that
W|φ = {x ∈ W : M, x |= φ}, ≤|φ=≤ ∩(W|φ ×W|φ), R|φ = R ∩ (W|φ ×W|φ)
and for all p ∈ V AR, V|φ(p) = V (p) ∩ W|φ. Note that if M is upward
closed then M|φ is upward closed too. However, there exists a standard model
M = (W,R, V ), there exists x ∈W and there exists an announcement formula
φ in the S4PAL’s language such that M, x |= φ and M|φ is not standard. For
example, in the standard model M = (W,≤, R, V ) where W = {x, y, z, t, u},
≤= {(x, x), (x, t), (y, y), (y, z), (z, z), (t, t), (u, u)}, R = {(x, y), (t, z), (t, u)} and
V (p) = {y, z}, we have M, x |= !p, M, y |= !p, M, z |= !p, M, t -|= !p
and M, u |= !p. Hence, M|!p = (W|!p,≤|!p, R|!p, V|!p) where W|!p =
{x, y, z, u}, ≤|!p= {(x, x), (y, y), (y, z), (z, z), (u, u)}, R|!p = {(x, y)} and
V|!p(p) = {y, z} is not standard. Nevertheless, this never happens when the
announcement formula φ is the resulting translation of a formula in the IPAL’s
language.
Lemma 10.1 Let φ be a formula in the IPAL’s language. For all standard
models M = (W,≤, R, V ) and for all x ∈ W , if M, x |= τ(φ) then M|τ(φ) is
standard and for all y ∈W , if x ≤ y then M, y |= τ(φ).
Lemma 10.2 Let φ be a formula in the IPAL’s language. The formula
τ(φ)→ #τ(φ) is s-valid.
A formula φ in the S4PAL’s language is said to be globally satisfied in a
model M = (W,≤, R, V ) (denoted M |= φ) if for all x ∈ W , M, x |= φ. We
shall say that a formula φ in the S4PAL’s language is s-valid (denoted |=s φ)
if for all standard models M, M |= φ.
Lemma 10.3 Let φ be a formula in the IPAL’s language. For all upward
closed standard models M = (W,≤, R, V ) and for all x ∈ W , the following
conditions are equivalent: (i) M, x |= φ, (ii) M, x |= τ(φ).
Proposition 10.4 Let φ be a formula in the IPAL’s language. The following
conditions are equivalent: (i) |=ucs φ, (ii) |=s τ(φ).
Proof. (i)⇒(ii): By Proposition 4.4, it suffices to demonstrate that the re-
sulting translations of the formulas A1–A14 are s-valid and that the resulting
translations of the inference rules (R1)–(R3) are s-validity preserving.
(ii)⇒(i): By Lemma 10.3. ✷
Obviously, for all formulas φ in the IPAL’s language, size(τ(φ)) ≤ 2 ×
size(φ). Nevertheless, seeing that the complexity of the membership problem
in the set of all s-valid formulas in S4PAL’s language is unknown, Proposi-
tion 10.4 does not give us any upper bound on the complexity of the member-
ship problem in the set of all ucs-valid formulas in IPAL’s language.
11 Conclusion
In this paper, firstly, we have given a sound and complete axiomatization of
IPAL and we have proved its completeness. Secondly, we have studied the
features that might be expected of any intuitionistic modal logic and we have
examined whether IPAL possesses them. Thirdly, we have proposed an alter-
native semantics for IPAL and we have designed a new sequent calculus for
IPAL that is sound and complete. Fourthly, we have defined a translation of
IPAL’s formulas into formulas of a multimodal logic in which the construct
(· → ·) is the one of classical propositional logic. Much remains to be done:
computability of the membership problem in the set of all ucs-valid formulas
in IPAL’s language; multi-agent variants with or without positive introspec-
tion, negative introspection, common knowledge, distributed knowledge, etc;
extension of our framework to intermediate logics.
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Annex
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Let FOR be the set of all formulas φ such that for
all upward closed standard models M = (W,≤, R, V ) and for all x ∈ W ,
if M, x |= φ then M|φ is upward closed standard and for all y ∈ W , if
x ≤ y then M, y |= φ. Lemma 2.1 says that for all formulas φ, φ ∈ FOR.
We will demonstrate it by an induction on φ based on the function size(·)
defined in Section 2. Let φ be a formula such that for all formulas ψ, if
size(ψ) < size(φ) then ψ ∈ FOR. We demonstrate φ ∈ FOR. We only
consider the case φ = ✸ψ. Note that size(ψ) < size(φ). Hence, ψ ∈ FOR.
Let M = (W,≤, R, V ) be an upward closed standard model and x ∈ W be
such that M, x |= ✸ψ.
Let y, z, t ∈ W|✸ψ be such that y ≤|✸ψ z and yR|✸ψt. We demonstrate there
exists u ∈ W|✸ψ such that zR|✸ψu and t ≤|✸ψ u. Since y ≤|✸ψ z and yR|✸ψt,
therefore y ≤ z and yRt. Let u ∈ W be such that zRu and t ≤ u. Such u
exists because M is standard. Since t ∈ W|✸ψ, therefore M, t |= ✸ψ. Hence,
there exists v ∈ W such that tRv and M, v |= ψ. Let w ∈ W be such that
uRw and v ≤ w. Such w exists because M is standard and t ≤ u. Since M is
upward closed standard, ψ ∈ FOR and M, v |= ψ, therefore M, w |= ψ. Since
uRw, therefore M, u |= ✸ψ. Thus, u ∈ W|✸ψ. Since z, t ∈ W|✸ψ, zRu and
t ≤ u, therefore zR|✸ψu and t ≤|✸ψ u.
Let y, z, t ∈ W|✸ψ be such that yR|✸ψz and z ≤|✸ψ t. We demonstrate there
exists u ∈ W|✸ψ such that y ≤|✸ψ u and uR|✸ψt. Since yR|✸ψz and z ≤|✸ψ t,
therefore yRz and z ≤ t. Let u ∈ W be such that y ≤ u and uRt. Such u
exists because M is standard. Since y ∈ W|✸ψ, therefore M, y |= ✸ψ. Hence,
there exists v ∈ W such that yRv and M, v |= ψ. Let w ∈ W be such that
uRw and v ≤ w. Such w exists because M is standard and y ≤ u. Since M is
upward closed standard, ψ ∈ FOR and M, v |= ψ, therefore M, w |= ψ. Since
uRw, therefore M, u |= ✸ψ. Thus, u ∈ W|✸ψ. Since y, t ∈ W|✸ψ, y ≤ u and
uRt, therefore y ≤|✸ψ u and uR|✸ψt.
Let y ∈ W be such that x ≤ y. We demonstrate M, y |= ✸ψ. Since
M, x |= ✸ψ, therefore there exists z ∈ W such that xRz and M, z |= ψ. Let
t ∈ W be such that yRt and z ≤ t. Such t exists because M is standard and
x ≤ y. Since M is upward closed standard, ψ ∈ FOR and M, z |= ψ, therefore
M, t |= ψ. Since yRt, therefore M, y |= ✸ψ.
Proof of Lemma 2.2: Suppose φ ∈ PAL. Hence, φ is globally PAL-
satisfied in M. Since ≤ is the identity relation on W , therefore one can
demonstrate by an induction on ψ based on the function size(·) defined in
Section 2, that for all formulas ψ and for all x ∈ W , M, x |= ψ iff ψ is
PAL-satisfied at x in M. Since φ is globally PAL-satisfied in M, therefore
M |= φ.
Proof of Lemma 5.1: The proof is similar to the proof in [17, Chap-
ter 3].
Proof of Lemma 5.2: The proof is similar to the proof in [17, Chap-
ter 3].
Proof of Lemma 5.3: The proof is similar to the proof in [17, Chap-
ter 3].
Proof of Lemma 5.4: By Proposition 4.3, let ψ be an announcement-
free formula such that φ ↔ ψ ∈ IPAL. Hence, the following conditions are
equivalent: (i) Mc, x |= φ, (ii) Mc, x |= ψ, (iii) ψ ∈ x, (iv) φ ∈ x. The
equivalence between (i) and (ii) follows from Proposition 4.1, Lemma 5.2 and
the fact that φ ↔ ψ ∈ IPAL. The equivalence between (ii) and (iii) follows
from Lemma 5.3. The equivalence between (iii) and (iv) follows from the fact
that L is an extension of IPAL and φ↔ ψ ∈ IPAL.
Proof of Lemma 6.3: It suffices to demonstrate that the formulas
A1–A14 are X-deducible and that the inference rules (R1) and (R2) are
X-deducibility preserving.
Proof of Lemma 8.1: Let FOR+ be the set of all nonempty sequences
(φ1, . . . ,φn,φ) of formulas such that for all modelsM = (W,≤, R, V ) and for all
x ∈W , M, x |= [φ1] . . . [φn]φ iff if M, x, ǫ " φ1, . . . , M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn−1) " φn
then M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn) " φ. Lemma 8.1 says that for all nonempty
sequences (φ1, . . . ,φn,φ) of formulas (φ1, . . . ,φn,φ) ∈ FOR
+. We will
demonstrate it by an induction on (φ1, . . . ,φn,φ) based on the function
size(·) defined in Section 2. Let (φ1, . . . ,φn,φ) be a nonempty sequence
of formulas such that for all nonempty sequences (φ′1, . . . ,φ
′
n′ ,φ
′), if
size(φ′1, . . . ,φ
′
n′ ,φ
′) < size(φ1, . . . ,φn,φ) then (φ
′
1, . . . ,φ
′
n′ ,φ
′) ∈ FOR+. We
demonstrate (φ1, . . . ,φn,φ) ∈ FOR
+. We only consider the case φ = ✸ψ.
Note that for all i = 1 . . . n, size(φ1, . . . ,φi−1,φi) < size(φ1, . . . ,φn,φ).
Moreover, size(φ1, . . . ,φn,ψ) < size(φ1, . . . ,φn,φ). Hence, for all i = 1 . . . n,
(φ1, . . . ,φi−1,φi) ∈ FOR
+. Moreover, (φ1, . . . ,φn,ψ) ∈ FOR
+. Let
M = (W,≤, R, V ) be a model and let x ∈ W . Leaving the case n = 0 to the
reader, we assume that n ≥ 1.
Suppose M, x |= [φ1] . . . [φn]✸ψ. Suppose M, x, ǫ " φ1, . . . ,
M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn−1) " φn. Since for all i = 1 . . . n, (φ1, . . . ,φi−1,φi) ∈ FOR
+,
therefore for all i = 1 . . . n, M, x |= [φ1] . . . [φi−1]φi. Let y ∈ W
be such that for all i = 1 . . . n, M, y |= [φ1] . . . [φi−1]φi, xRy and
M, y |= [φ1] . . . [φn]ψ. Such y exists because M, x |= [φ1] . . . [φn]✸ψ
and for all i = 1 . . . n, M, x |= [φ1] . . . [φi−1]φi. Since for all i = 1 . . . n,
(φ1, . . . ,φi−1,φi) ∈ FOR
+ and (φ1, . . . ,φn,ψ) ∈ FOR
+, therefore for all
i = 1 . . . n, M, y, (φ1, . . . ,φi−1) " φi and M, y, (φ1, . . . ,φn) " ψ. Since xRy,
therefore M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn) " ✸ψ.
Suppose if M, x, ǫ " φ1, . . . , M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn−1) " φn then
M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn) " ✸ψ. Suppose M, x -|= [φ1] . . . [φn]✸ψ. Hence, for
all i = 1 . . . n, M, x |= [φ1] . . . [φi−1]φi and for all y ∈ W , if for all i = 1 . . . n,
M, y |= [φ1] . . . [φi−1]φi and xRy then M, y -|= [φ1] . . . [φn]ψ. Since for
all i = 1 . . . n, (φ1, . . . ,φi−1,φi) ∈ FOR
+, therefore for all i = 1 . . . n,
M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φi−1) " φi. Since if M, x, ǫ " φ1, . . . , M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn−1) " φn
then M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn) " ✸ψ, therefore M, x, (φ1, . . . ,φn) " ✸ψ. Let
y ∈ W be such that for all i = 1 . . . n, M, y, (φ1, . . . ,φi−1) " φi, xRy and
M, y, (φ1, . . . ,φn) " ψ. Since for all i = 1 . . . n, (φ1, . . . ,φi−1,φi) ∈ FOR
+ and
(φ1, . . . ,φn,ψ) ∈ FOR
+, therefore for all i = 1 . . . n, M, y |= [φ1] . . . [φi−1]φi
and M, y |= [φ1] . . . [φn]ψ. Since xRy, therefore M, x |= [φ1] . . . [φn]✸ψ: a
contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 10.1: Let FOR be the set of all formulas φ in the
IPAL’s language such that for all standard models M = (W,≤, R, V ) and for
all x ∈W , if M, x |= τ(φ) then M|τ(φ) is standard and for all y ∈W , if x ≤ y
then M, y |= τ(φ). Lemma 10.1 says that for all formulas φ in the IPAL’s
language, φ ∈ FOR. We will demonstrate it by an induction on φ based on
the function size(·) defined in Section 2. Let φ be a formula such that for all
formulas ψ, if size(ψ) < size(φ) then ψ ∈ FOR. We demonstrate φ ∈ FOR.
We only consider the case φ = ✸ψ. Note that size(ψ) < size(φ). Hence,
ψ ∈ FOR. Let M = (W,≤, R, V ) be a standard model and x ∈ W be such
that M, x |= ✸τ(ψ).
Let y, z, t ∈ W|✸τ(ψ) be such that y ≤|✸τ(ψ) z and yR|✸τ(ψ)t. We demon-
strate there exists u ∈ W|✸τ(ψ) such that zR|✸τ(ψ)u and t ≤|✸τ(ψ) u. Since
y ≤|✸τ(ψ) z and yR|✸τ(ψ)t, therefore y ≤ z and yRt. Let u ∈ W be such that
zRu and t ≤ u. Such u exists because M is standard. Since t ∈ W|✸τ(ψ),
therefore M, t |= ✸τ(ψ). Hence, there exists v ∈ W such that tRv and
M, v |= τ(ψ). Let w ∈ W be such that uRw and v ≤ w. Such w exists
because M is standard and t ≤ u. Since M is standard, ψ ∈ FOR and
M, v |= τ(ψ), therefore M, w |= τ(ψ). Since uRw, therefore M, u |= ✸τ(ψ).
Thus, u ∈ W|✸τ(ψ). Since z, t ∈ W|✸τ(ψ), zRu and t ≤ u, therefore zR|✸τ(ψ)u
and t ≤|✸τ(ψ) u.
Let y, z, t ∈ W|✸τ(ψ) be such that yR|✸τ(ψ)z and z ≤|✸τ(ψ) t. We demonstrate
there exists u ∈W|✸τ(ψ) such that y ≤|✸τ(ψ) u and uR|✸τ(ψ)t. Since yR|✸τ(ψ)z
and z ≤|✸τ(ψ) t, therefore yRz and z ≤ t. Let u ∈ W be such that y ≤ u
and uRt. Such u exists because M is standard. Since y ∈ W|✸τ(ψ), therefore
M, y |= ✸τ(ψ). Hence, there exists v ∈ W such that yRv and M, v |= τ(ψ).
Let w ∈W be such that uRw and v ≤ w. Such w exists because M is standard
and y ≤ u. Since M is standard, ψ ∈ FOR and M, v |= τ(ψ), therefore
M, w |= τ(ψ). Since uRw, therefore M, u |= ✸τ(ψ). Thus, u ∈W|✸τ(ψ). Since
y, t ∈W|✸τ(ψ), y ≤ u and uRt, therefore y ≤|✸τ(ψ) u and uR|✸τ(ψ)t.
Let y ∈ W be such that x ≤ y. We demonstrate M, y |= ✸τ(ψ). Since
M, x |= ✸τ(ψ), therefore there exists z ∈W such that xRz and M, z |= τ(ψ).
Let t ∈ W be such that yRt and z ≤ t. Such t exists because M is standard
and x ≤ y. Since M is standard, ψ ∈ FOR and M, z |= τ(ψ), therefore
M, t |= τ(ψ). Since yRt, therefore M, y |= ✸τ(ψ).
Proof of Lemma 10.2: Let FOR be the set of all formulas φ in the IPAL’s
language such that the formula τ(φ)→ #τ(φ) is s-valid. Lemma 10.2 says that
for all formulas φ in the IPAL’s language, φ ∈ FOR. We will demonstrate it
by an induction on φ based on the function size(·) defined in Section 2. Let φ
be a formula such that for all formulas ψ, if size(ψ) < size(φ) then ψ ∈ FOR.
We demonstrate φ ∈ FOR. We only consider the case φ = 〈ψ〉χ. Note that
size(ψ) < size(φ) and size(χ) < size(φ). Hence, ψ ∈ FOR and χ ∈ FOR.
Thus, the formulas τ(ψ) → #τ(ψ) and τ(χ) → #τ(χ) are s-valid. Let us
consider the following formulas: (i) 〈τ(ψ)〉τ(χ), (ii) τ(ψ) ∧ [τ(ψ)]τ(χ),
(iii) #τ(ψ) ∧ [τ(ψ)]#τ(χ), (iv) #τ(ψ) ∧ (τ(ψ) → #[τ(ψ)]τ(χ)),
(v) #τ(ψ) ∧ #[τ(ψ)]τ(χ), (vi) #(τ(ψ) ∧ [τ(ψ)]τ(χ)), (vii) #〈τ(ψ)〉τ(χ).
The s-validity of the formula (i)→(ii) follows from the definition of the
satisfiability of formulas in the S4PAL’s language. The s-validity of the
formula (ii)→(iii) follows from the s-validity of the formulas τ(ψ) → #τ(ψ)
and τ(χ) → #τ(χ). The s-validity of the formulas (iii)→(iv), (iv)→(v),
(v)→(vi) and (vi)→(vii) follows from the definition of the satisfiability of
formulas in the S4PAL’s language.
Proof of Lemma 10.3: Let FOR be the set of all formulas φ in the IPAL’s
language such that for all upward closed standard models M = (W,≤, R, V )
and for all x ∈ W , M, x |= φ iff M, x |= τ(φ). Lemma 10.3 says that for all
formulas φ in the IPAL’s language, φ ∈ FOR. We will demonstrate it by an
induction on φ based on the function size(·) defined in Section 2. Let φ be
a formula such that for all formulas ψ, if size(ψ) < size(φ) then ψ ∈ FOR.
We demonstrate φ ∈ FOR. We only consider the case φ = 〈ψ〉χ. Note that
size(ψ) < size(φ) and size(χ) < size(φ). Hence, ψ ∈ FOR and χ ∈ FOR.
Let M = (W,≤, R, V ) be an upward closed standard model and x ∈W .
Suppose M, x |= 〈ψ〉χ. Hence, M, x |= ψ and M|ψ, x |= χ. Since ψ ∈ FOR,
therefore {y ∈ W : M, y |= ψ} = {y ∈ W : M, y |= τ(ψ)} and M|ψ = M|τ(ψ).
Moreover, since χ ∈ FOR, M, x |= ψ and M|ψ, x |= χ, therefore M, x |= τ(ψ)
and M|ψ, x |= τ(χ). Since M|ψ = M|τ(ψ), therefore M|τ(ψ), x |= τ(χ). Thus,
M, x |= 〈τ(ψ)〉τ(χ).
Suppose M, x |= 〈τ(ψ)〉τ(χ). Hence, M, x |= τ(ψ) and M|τ(ψ), x |= τ(χ).
Since ψ ∈ FOR, therefore {y ∈ W : M, y |= ψ} = {y ∈ W : M, y |= τ(ψ)}
and M|ψ = M|τ(ψ). Moreover, since χ ∈ FOR, M, x |= τ(ψ) and
M|τ(ψ), x |= τ(χ), therefore M, x |= ψ and M|τ(ψ), x |= χ. Since
M|ψ = M|τ(ψ), therefore M|ψ, x |= χ. Thus, M, x |= 〈ψ〉χ.
